Constitutional Law -- Bursey v. Weatherford: The Sixth Amendment Protection Against Secret Agents in the  Counsels of Defense by Gilkey, Sara McPeake
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 54 | Number 6 Article 7
9-1-1976
Constitutional Law -- Bursey v. Weatherford: The
Sixth Amendment Protection Against Secret
Agents in the "Counsels of Defense"
Sara McPeake Gilkey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sara M. Gilkey, Constitutional Law -- Bursey v. Weatherford: The Sixth Amendment Protection Against Secret Agents in the "Counsels of
Defense", 54 N.C. L. Rev. 1276 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol54/iss6/7
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Bursey v. Weatherford: The Sixth Amend-
ment Protection Against Secret Agents in the "Counsels of
Defense"'
The right of a criminal defendant to have the assistance of counsel
is secured by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court has declared that "[tffhis is one of the safeguards
... deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty."2  Corollary to the right to counsel is the right to privacy in the
attorney-client relationship, 3 which is essential for effective representa-
tion. As interpreted by one court:
The Constitution's prohibitions against unreasonable searches,
and its guarantees of due process of law and effective representa-
tion by counsel, lose most of their substance if the Government
can with impunity place a secret agent in a lawyer's office to in-
spect the confidential papers of 'the defendant and his advisers,
to listen to their conversations, and to participate in their counsels
of defense.4
In Bursey v. Weatherford5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused
on the right to counsel in the context of our adversary system of justice
and held that any deliberate intrusion by the prosecution into the
confidential relationship between defendant and his counsel constitutes a
violation of the sixth amendment guarantee. 6
The constitutional issue was raised in federal court when Brett
Bursey brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 19837 seeking damages
1. See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
2. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
3. Confidentiality is the basis of Canon four of the American Bar Association
,Code of Professional Responsibility and of the attorney-client privilege in the rules of
evidence. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 201 (Tent. Draft
1970); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
4. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d at 881.
5. 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. June 22,
1976).
6. Id. at 486.
7. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
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from J. P. Strom, chief of the South Carolina State Law Enforcement
Division, and Jack Weatherford, an undercover agent for that Division
assigned to the University of South Carolina campus.8 Bursey alleged
that these officials, acting under color of state law, had invaded the
confidences of his defense team and thus had deprived him of effective
assistance of counsel in his prior criminal trial in state court.9
Bursey's civil suit arose out of an unusual chain of events. On
March 20, 1970, Bursey and several others, including agent Weather-
ford, expressed their opposition to the war in Vietnam by throwing a
brick through the window of the Richland County Selective Service
Office in Columbia, South Carolina, and by defacing the building with
red paint.10 Later that day Weatherford arranged not only for Bursey's
arrest but also for his own, and they were subsequently indicted as co-
defendants for malicious destruction of property."1 The purpose of
Weatherford's arrest was to maintain his cover so that he could continue
working as a secret agent in the university community.'" Weatherford,
with the approval of his superiors, perfected the ruse by retaining
defense counsel and by feigning preparation for trial.'"
During the period prior to trial, Bursey was completely deceived by
the agent's tactics and continued to believe that Weatherford was his
friend and "partner in crime."'14 On at least two occasions, Bursey and
his attorney freely discussed the pending trial in the presence of Weath-
erford.15 Subsequently, the agenfs true status was discovered; and
since he was no longer useful for undercover work, Strom permitted him
to testify against Bursey.' 6 Totally unprepared for Weatherford's in-
criminating eyewitness testimony, Bursey was convicted of malicious
destruction of property. The court sentenced him to eighteen months in
prison, and he served his time.' 7 Thus an opportunity to appeal was no
longer available to Bursey.
The federal district court held that the conduct of Weatherford and
Strom did not violate Bursey's constitutional right to counsel. The
8. 528 F.2d at 484.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 485.
11. Id.
12. Brief for Appellee at 3, Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975).
13. 528 F.2d at 485.
14. Id.
15. Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.
1975).
16. 528 F.2d at 485.
17. Id.
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court based its opinion on two grounds: (1) there was no "gross"
intrusion into the area protected by the sixth amendment because the
specific intention of Weatherford and Strom was to preserve the agent's
cover, not to spy on the defense team; and (2) since Weatherford did
not communicate any information concerning trial strategy to the prose-
cution, Bursey was not prejudiced by the presence of the opposition at
attorney-client conferences.' 8 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court decision and held that neither "gross" intrusion
nor actual prejudice to defendant is required to sustain plaintiff's claim
for damages for breach of his constitutional right to counsel."0
Before evaluating the court's decision, it is necessary to review the
legal precedent established by judicial elaboration of the constitutional
safeguard. Until the 1930's the essence of the right to counsel was
merely the right of defendant to retain counsel. 20  However, in 1932,
the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama21 emphasized
the fundamental character of the right to counsel and declared that
"[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. '' 22  Relying on the
fourteenth amendment rather than the sixth, the Court held that at least
in capital cases in which defendants are handicapped by ignorance,
illiteracy, youth, and public hostility, failure to appoint effective counsel
constitutes a denial of due process of law.23
The independent sixth amendment right to counsel was recognized
for the first time in Johnson v. Zerbst,24 a 1938 decision. In that case
the Court looked to the nature of the offense and held that in every
federal criminal case, both capital and non-capital, the accused who is
unable to retain counsel must either have counsel appointed or must
make "an intelligent and competent waiver. '25  Subsequent to Johnson,
the Court gradually expanded the sixth amendment right to encompass
various degrees of state offenses. The landmark decision of Gideon v.
18. Id. at 486.
19. Id. at 486-87.
20. M. AEE NATRY, CIvuL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 181 (2d ed. 1973);
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 599 (3d ed.
1858).
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Id. at 68-69.
23. Id. at 71. See generally W. BEANEY, THE RIoHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS 229 (1955).
24. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25. Id. at 465. See also A. HAmDING, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS 40 (1959).
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Wainwright2" in 1963 overruled the prior Court holding in Betts v.
Brady17 and incorporated the sixth amendment into the fourteenth, 2s
thus securing the individual's right to counsel from infringement by state
action. Since the Court found criminal defense attorneys to be "necessi-
ties, not luxuries," 29 state courts were constitutionally required to ap-
point counsel for all indigents defending against felony charges. The
right was recently extended in Argersinger v. Hamlins° to indigents
defending in state courts against misdemeanors punishable by imprison-
ment.
In addition to judicial development of the right to counsel accord-
ing to the nature of the offense, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
sixth amendment protection in terms of critical stages in the criminal
process. The scope of the sixth amendment protection has not been
restricted to actual trial, but has been interpreted broadly so as to
encompass every stage from the time of initial adversary proceedings3'
to post-conviction appeals.12  In Escobedo v. Illinois33 the right to
counsel was found to attach as early as the moment the investigation had
"begun to focus on a particular suspect. '34  However, prior to attach-
ment," the sixth amendment does not bar general undercover activity. 36
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally TUFTS UNIVEsrry, THE CouRTs MAKE
POLICY: THm STORY OF CLARENCE EARL GIDEON (1969).
27. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942). See also I. BRANT, THE BrLL OF RIGHTS 480
(1965).
28. 372 U.S. at 342.
29. Id. at 344.
30. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
31. Pre-trial proceedings at which the Supreme Court has held that the accused has
a right to counsel include arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
lineups, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); and preliminary hearings, Coleman
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
32. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This case was limited to appeals
of right by Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. Id. at 490.
35. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the point of attachment was limited
to the commencement of formal judicial proceedings. The Court distinguished Escobedo
and refused to extend the right to counsel to lineups, which were prior to the "initiation
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. at 689.
36. 'The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer
or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the
conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963). See also United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966); Comment, Present and Suggested
Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. CoLo.
L. R v. 261, 272-73 (1969).
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Since the accused in Bursey v. Weatherford had been taken into custody
and indicted, his constitutional guarantee was clearly operative.
Proof of intrusion into the sphere protected by the sixth amend-
ment has been held a sufficient ground to overturn a conviction regard-
less of the presence or absence of actual prejudice to defendants. The
United States Supreme Court in two cases, Black v. United States" and
O'Brien v. United States,"8 vacated judgments in the absence of any
showing that the information gleaned from monitored conversations had
been used by the prosecution to the detriment of defendant. 39 These two
decisions were consistent with an earlier declaration of the Court in
Glasser v. United States:40 "The right to have the assistance of counsel is
too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calcula-
tions as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.' 1
The only Supreme Court decision that has deviated from the per se
approach to encroachment upon the sixth amendment right to counsel is
Hoffa v. United States.42  In that case the Court affirmed the jury-
tampering conviction of Hoffa even though a government agent, Partin,
had infiltrated the defense team at Hoffa's prior trial, during which the
bribe was offered. The Court adopted the "separate offense theory,"
finding that Hoffa's incriminating statements to which agent Partin
testified in the later case "were totally unrelated in both time and subject
matter to any assumed intrusion by Partin into the conferences of the
petitioner's counsel in the [prior] trial."4  The Court concluded that if
Hoffa had been convicted in. the first trial, "the conviction would
presumptively have been set aside as constitutionally defective!'"4 on the
ground of gross government infringement of the right to counsel. The
presumption, however, was inoperative in a trial for a different offense.
In Bursey v. Weatherford the court correctly identified the "sepa-
rate offense theory" as the basis of the Ho fa decision and rejected the
prosecutions theory that Hoffa mandated a "grossness" test.45 Indeed
37. 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam).
38. 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam).
39. 386 U.S. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 385 U.S. at 30-31 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
40. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
41. Id. at 76.
42. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
43. Id. at 309. The "separate offense theory" has been adopted by the lower
federal courts. E.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 353 F. Supp. 515, 516-17 (D.D.C. 1973).
44. 385 U.S. at 307.
45. 528 F.2d at 486. Accord, United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 976 (3d Cir.
1972).
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two examples4" of government misconduct, analogous to the activity of
agent Partin, were characterized in Hoffa as intrusions of the "grossest
kind. ' 47  However, the Court's dictum does not require classification
according to the degree of offensiveness. Adoption of the "grossness"
test would mean that the presumption of a fair trial could be rebutted
only by showing government intrusion so egregious that the conviction
was actually tainted.48
In order to avoid placing such a heavy burden of proof on the
accused, the Fourth Circuit in Bursey proposed another test, under
which the crucial determination is whether the conduct of the prosecu-
tion represents deliberate or inadverent action. Thus "whenever the
prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to
require reversal and a new trial."49  Although the precise holding is
limited by the civil posture of Bursey's case, this dictum is significant in
that it proclaims the court's position on convictions as well as on civil
damages.
The test adopted by the Fourth Circuit is notable in two respects.
First, under the test, specific intent of the prosecution is immaterial since
the mere presence of an authorized government informant for any
purpose constitutes a violation of the right to counsel.50 In our adver-
sary system of justice, "learning the plans of one's opponent . . . is
generally thought to be worthwhile." 51  Thus the "deliberateness" test
protects the accused not only from the possibility of wilful infringement
by the prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence but also from
the subtle benefits derived from knowledge of the planned procedure
and state of mind of defendant and his counsel.5"
Secondly, the test eliminates actual prejudice as an essential ele-
ment for sustaining a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Deprivation is the sole injury to which the statute refers. Thus plaintiff
46. The cases to which the Court refers are Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
47. 385 U.S. at 306.
48. See United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 977 (3d Cir. 1972).
49. 528 F.2d at 486.
50. Id. The finding of liability under section 1983 without proof of specific intent
is consistent with established authority. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961);
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74,
81 (3d Cir. 1965).
51. 528 F.2d at 487.
52. Accord, Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 1968).
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need prove only that some person acting under color of state law
deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitu-
tion. Plaintiff is not statutorily required to establish a causal connection
between deprivation and further injury.11
Implicit in the court's expression of the test in terms of civil
relief is approval of the same approach to prejudice in the criminal
context. Overturning a conviction for a deliberate sixth amendment
violation without proof of actual harm is considered a more radical
stance on the issue of prejudice and is therefore unacceptable to some
courts. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Zarzour" viewed "with a
jaundiced eye the conduct of the government" but held that such activity
alone would not vitiate the conviction. 5 The Second Circuit has con-
curred in this position.56 Diametrically opposed is the absolute ap-
proach to the right to counsel that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals expressed in Coplon v. United States:57 "This is a fundamental
right which cannot be abridged, interfered with, or impinged upon in
any manner."5 8 It appears from the allusion to the criminal law setting
in the Bursey holding that the Fourth Circuit is more inclined to adopt
the latter approach and hold that constitutional rights must be "scrupu-
lously observed" 59 if a conviction is to stand.
The strength of -the test proposed in Bursey is readily apparent.
The obvious difficulties in satisfying either a specific intent or an actual
prejudice requirement would severely restrict the sixth amendment pro-
tection. Although the Fourth Circuit test greatly alleviates the burden
of proof placed on the accused, it fails to embrace fully the per se rule
set forth in Black v. United States and O'Brien v. United States.0° In
the former, the prosecution unwittingly referred to notes that con-
tained excerpts from monitored conversations,"' and in the latter, the
contents of the communications were not even transmitted to the prose-
53. Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 504 (1972). However, plaintiff is required to rebut a good faith defense. Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973).
54. 432 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Id. at 3; accord, United States v. Cohen, 358 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
See generally Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TExAs L. Rev.
203, 237-38 (1975).
56. United States v. Mosca, 475 F.2d 1052, 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
948 (1973).
57. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
58. Id. at 759.
59. Id. at 760.
60. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
61. 385 U.S. at 28.
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cution in any form 62 The weakness of the Bursey test is the court's
apparent departure from the strict per se rule established in Black and
O'Brien when the intrusion in question -is inadvertent. The distinc-
tion turns solely upon a finding of "deliberateness," an imprecise criter-
ion that requires a subjective evaluation of the state of mind of the
prosecution. From the point of view of the accused, knowledgeable
conduct may at times be as difficult to prove as gross activity.
The significance of Bursey lies in its impact on the alministration
of criminal justice. The court's analysis demonstrates a full apprecia-
tion of the ramifications of the right to counsel protection. Undistract-
ed by peripheral issues such as "grossness" and actual prejudice, the
court sought to achieve the fundamental objectives of the sixth amend-
ment. The decision serves two functions that are essential in our
adversary system of justice: (1) misconduct by the prosecution is
deterred, and (2) privacy in the attorney-client relationship is preserved.
Official abuse of a constitutional right is reprehensible in itself. The
fact that the prosecution does not actually benefit from intrusion into
defense counseling does not excuse the violation. 8 Indeed the conse-
quences of abuse for defendant are immaterial in light of the purpose of
section 1983 to preserve constitutional freedoms by punishing the
offending officials.
The second function of Bursey is equally crucial. Privacy is a
prerequisite to an effective attorney-client relationship. Good legal
advice depends upon full knowledge of the circumstances. Unless the
accused feels free to confide in his attorney, the right to counsel is a
hollow guarantee.64
Bursey represents a pragmatic approach to sixth amendment pro-
tection. The court fashioned a solution that reflects sensitivity to the
foreseeable consequences for the accused and that gives substance to the
constitutional maxim. The crux of Bursey is that the right to effective
assistance of counsel remains intact, unfettered by judicial limitations,
thus facilitating the proper administration of criminal justice.
SARA McPEAKE GILKEY
62. 386 U.S. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Udited States ex rel. Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955).
64. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1966).
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